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ENABLING THE DISABLED:
REASSIGNMENT AND THE ADA
JOHN E. MURRAY AND CHRISTOPHER J. MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION
Assume you are an employer. You have an employee who becomes
disabled and can no longer continue in his or her current position, even
with an accommodation. Another job becomes vacant. The disabled
employee is qualified for this job, but you would prefer to transfer a
non-disabled employee whom you believe to be more qualified. What
can you do? Are you obligated to transfer a disabled employee who can
no longer perform his or her current job duties? If so, must you give the
vacant job to the qualified disabled employee even if there is a more
qualified non-disabled employee you would rather transfer to that job?
With the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),'
Congress hoped to break down unnecessary barriers to the employment
of qualified individuals with disabilities.2 Congress concluded that state
* John Murray is an attorney with Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
where he practices on the firm's Employment Litigation Team. Mr. Murray represents
employers in all aspects of employment litigation in state and federal court and before state
and federal administrative agencies. He also advises employers on compliance issues relating
to state and federal employment laws. Chris Murray is a law student at the University of
Iowa College of Law. He will graduate in May 2001. The authors wish to thank Joy
Burkholder and Shelly Ranus for their support and assistance.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (1999).
2. The Senate Committee on Education and Human Resources found:
Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and
poverty.
According to a recent Lou Harris poll, not working is perhaps the truest definition
of what it means to be disabled in America. Two thirds of all disabled Americans
between the age
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laws protecting the disabled, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, were
not addressing this problem effectively.3 Consequently, the employment
provisions of the ADA went well beyond the Rehabilitation Act,
prohibiting private employers from discriminating against the disabled
and affirmatively compelling them to modify their workplaces to
accommodate qualified disabled workers.
Under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the failure to
make a reasonable accommodation is a form of unlawful discrimination.
However, the ADA, for the first time, specifically included
reassignment as one accommodation employers must consider for
disabled employees In 1992, Congress amended the Rehabilitation
Act to include reassignment as an accommodation.5 Federal courts have
recognized that the statutory obligation to reassign is new.
Unfortunately, the courts have not provided much guidance on the
scope and parameters of this obligation. Courts have disagreed over
when there is an obligation to consider reassigning a disabled employee
and what it means to reassign.
This article explores the scope of the legal obligation to consider
reassignment as an accommodation under the ADA. Part I examines
when an employer has an obligation to consider reassignment as a
possible accommodation; concluding that reassignment should be
explored whenever a disability makes an employee unable to perform
the essential functions of his or her current position.
Part II explores the scope of an employer's duty to reassign. Based
on the language of the ADA, its legislative history, and judicial and
administrative interpretations of the statute, employers should transfer
qualified disabled employees to vacant positions, regardless of whether
of 16 and 64 are not working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working say
that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age disabled persons, who are
not working, say that they would like to have a job. Translated into absolute terms,
this means that about 8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot
find a job.
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1, at 32-34 (1990).
3. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18-19 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29, 32
(1990).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
5. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (1994) amended by Pub. L. No. 102-59, Title V, § 506
(1992). As discussed more fully in Part I(A), infra, this amendment legislatively overruled
prior judicial pronouncements that the Rehabilitation Act did not require reassignment as an
accommodation.
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a more qualified non-disabled employee may be seeking the same
position. This obligation is limited by the contractual and quasi-
contractual rights of non-disabled employees, as well as the employer's
right to refuse any accommodation that would result in undue hardship.
Part III offers some practical guidance to employers who are
navigating the accommodation process.
I. WHEN SHOULD AN EMPLOYER CONSIDER REASSIGNMENT AS A
POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATION?
A. Reassignment Under the Rehabilitation Act
Because Congress, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), and the courts all have relied on the Rehabilitation Act for
guidance in interpreting the ADA, understanding the treatment of
reassignment as an accommodation under that statute is helpful to any
analysis of this accommodation under the ADA. As initially enacted,
the Rehabilitation Acte did not compel employers to reassign disabled
employees who became unable to perform their job duties.' In School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline,8 the United States Supreme Court
stated that the Rehabilitation Act only required that disabled employees
be given the same transfer opportunities as non-disabled employees. In
other words, there was no independent statutory obligation to reassign
disabled employees:
6. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1999).
7. Prior to 1992, the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act defined
reasonable accommodation to include "making facilities readily accessible..., job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.704(b) (1991). In 1992, this regulation was replaced by 29
C.F.R. § 1614.203, which specifically includes reassignment as an accommodation employers
must consider. See also, Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Until recently, the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations did not include reassignment to a
vacant position within the list of potential reasonable accommodations."); Shiring v. Runyon,
90 F.3d 827, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1996) (concluding that prior to 1992, the Rehabilitation Act did
not require reassignment to a vacant position); Fedro v. Reno 21 F.3d 1391, 1394-95 & n.5
(7th Cir. 1994) (finding that prior to 1992, the obligation to reasonably accommodate under
the Rehabilitation Act did not include transfer or reassignment); Bradley v. Univ. of Texas
M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1993); Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
997 F.2d 1028, 1035-36 (2d Cir.); Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320, 1326-27 (4th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting argument that Rehabilitation Act created any duty to reassign); Lyles v. Dep't of
the Army, 864 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-90 (1st Cir.
1989).
8. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are
not required to find another job for an employee who is not
qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an
employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably
available under the employer's existing policies.9
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act.'" For
the first time, employers had a statutory obligation to consider
reassignment as a possible accommodation for disabled workers."
Federal courts recognized that the specific inclusion of reassignment in
the list of illustrative accommodations was an expansion of the pre-
existing obligation to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act. Two
years later, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act so that the
standards for determining liability would be the same under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.3
B. Judicial Interpretations of the ADA's Obligation to Reassign
At first blush, the ADA's provisions relating to reassignment are
circular. The statute makes it unlawful for an employer to fail to make
reasonable accommodations for "an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability.' 4  Reasonable accommodations include reassignment to a
9. Id. at 289 n.19.
10. See Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990).
11. The ADA defined "reasonable accommodation" to include, "job restructuring, part-
time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)
(emphasis added).
12. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We
recognize that the ADA does expressly recognize 'reassignment to a vacant position' as an
expected form of reasonable accommodation, thereby rejecting a line of precedent under the
Rehabilitation Act holding that reassignment of a disabled employee was never required.")
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111); Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831 ("Although reassignment was an option
under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act.... it was not required of federal employers
under the Rehabilitation Act." (citation omitted)); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875
F.Supp. 393, 395-96 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1104
(S.D. Ga. 1995) ("The ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, contains explicit language
concerning the employer's duty to consider reassignment to a vacant position as a possible
accommodation if the employee is no longer able to perform the essential functions of his
original job.").
13. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (1992); Pub. L. No. 102-569, Title V, § 506; see also 29
C.F.R. § 1614.203(g); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Thus, whether suit is
filed against a federally-funded entity under the Rehabilitation Act or against a private
employer under the ADA, the substantive standards for determining liability are the same.").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1990).
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vacant position.'5 However, the ADA defines "qualified individual with
a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.',
16
These three provisions create an apparent contradiction. Only
qualified individuals are entitled to any accommodation, including
reassignment. However, a qualified individual is, by definition,
someone who can do the essential functions of his or her position. If a
disabled employee can do all of the essential functions of his or her job,
when would reassignment ever be necessary?
1. A Minority Of Courts Have Ruled That There Is No Obligation To
Reassign Disabled Employees Who Can No Longer Perform The
Essential Functions Of Their Current Position.
These apparently contradictory provisions have led some courts to
rule that a disabled employee is not entitled to reassignment if the
employee cannot perform the essential functions of his or her current
position. For example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, in
dicta, that there is no legal obligation to reassign an employee who is
unable to do the essential functions of his or her current position.7
Several federal district courts also have ruled, without discussion,
that the ADA's duty to reasonably accommodate does not include a
duty to reassign an employee who cannot perform the essential
functions of his or her current position.'8 Even though the ADA
includes a broader obligation to reassign than the pre-1992
Rehabilitation Act, these district courts have consistently relied on
Arline'9 for guidance in determining the scope of an employer's duty to
reassign under the ADA. Parisi v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,2° is
illustrative of these cases.
In Parisi, the federal District Court for the Eastern District of New
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
17. See Myers, 50 F.3d at 284.
18. See, eg., Cheatwood v. Roanoke Indus., 891 F. Supp. 1528, 1537 (N.D. Ala. 1995)
("[The duty of reasonable accommodation does not encompass a responsibility to provide a
disabled employee with alternative employment if the employee is unable to meet the
demands of his present position." (citing Myers, 50 F.3d at 284.)); Christopher v. Laidlaw
Transit Inc., 899 F.Supp. 1224, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Odessey v. Comcast Cablevision of
Maryland, 8 AD Cases 1036 (D. Md. 1998).
19. See School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 273 (1987). See also
supra text accompanying note 7.
20. 995 F.Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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York relied on Arline to rule that an employee, who cannot perform the
essential functions of his or her current position, is not qualified and is
not entitled to an accommodation, including the accommodation of
reassignment. 2' The court concluded that any right to a transfer or
reassignment would have to be based on a contract provision or prior
employment policy: "There is no general duty to transfer a disabled
employee unable to perform one job to another available position,
absent some showing-not made here-of a contractual right to transfer
or an established policy of such transfers." '' Thus, an employer need not
"provide disabled employees with alternative employment when the
employee is unable to meet the demands of his present position. '
According to Parisi, the ADA did nothing but extend the Supreme
Court's analysis in Arline to private employers.24 Several other courts
have disagreed with this analysis. These courts have ruled that the
ADA's specific reference to reassignment as an accommodation has
expanded the law beyond Arline and the pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act.
Their rationale is discussed more fully in the following section.
2. The Majority of Courts Addressing the Issue Have Ruled That
Employers Must Consider Reassigning Disabled Employees Who Can
No Longer Continue in Their Current Jobs.
Although decisions like Parisi have some basis in the plain language
of the ADA, they clearly represent a minority position. The majority of
courts addressing the issue have ruled that the ADA imposes an
obligation to consider reassignment whenever a disability makes an
employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or her current
position.' The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has reached this
21. See id. at 302-04. In Parisi, the plaintiff was a deliveryman for Coca-Cola. See id. at
299. He suffered a knee and leg injury that made him unable to continue working as a route
deliveryman. See id. The Court ruled that the plaintiff was not disabled; and that he was not
an "otherwise qualified individual" with a disability, since he could no longer do his job. See
id. at 302-03. Therefore, he was not entitled to any other accommodation, including
reassignment. See id. at 303.
22. Id. at 303.
23. Id. (citations omitted).
24. See id. at 303-04.
25. See, e.g., Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Gile
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu
Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 1998); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d
1284, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th
Cir. 1999) (en banc); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F.Supp. 482, 487 (W.D. Ark. 1994);
Community Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 676 (Colo. 1998).
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conclusion in several cases. For example, in Gile v. United Air Lines,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that only "qualified individuals" were
entitled to any accommodation, including reassignment.' In that case,
however, the only accommodation which would have allowed Ms. Gile
to continue working for United Air Lines was reassignment to a
different shift or position.' After reviewing the development of the
Rehabilitation Act through its 1992 amendments, the legislative history
of the ADA, and the EEOC's interpretation of that statute, the court
concluded that Ms. Gile may be entitled to reassignment, even though
she could no longer perform the essential functions of her current
position:
Our review of the ADA, its regulations, and the EEOC's
interpretive guidance leads us to the conclusion of the majority
of courts that have addressed the issue that the ADA may
require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a
different position as a reasonable accommodation where the
employee can no longer perform the essential functions of their
current position.29
That same year, in Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co.,' a different panel
of the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Gile 1 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Cudahy defined "qualified individual with a disability" as an "employee
[who] is able to perform the essential functions of his or her current job,
or some other available job, with or without accommodation."'32 Judge
Cudahy went on to state that, "in an appropriate case, the ADA may
require the employer to transfer the disabled employee to another
available job for which he or she is qualified."33
Two years later, in Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., the
26. 95 F.3d at 492.
27. Id. at 496.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 498. The Court also reviewed and criticized those cases finding no obligation
to reassign employees who become incapable of continuing in their current positions: "Those
courts which have found that reassignment to a different position cannot be a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA mistakenly rely upon pre-amendment Rehabilitation Act
cases .... " Id.
30. 102 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1996).
31. See iL
32. Id. (Cudahy, J., concurring).
33. Id; see also Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr.. 156 F.3d 1284, 1304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(en banc).
2000]
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Seventh Circuit articulated a two-step test to determine if a disabled
employee is a qualified individual.' First, the disabled employee must
establish that he or she has the necessary "educational background,
experience, skills, licenses, etc." to satisfy the employer's legitimate
qualifications for the position.35 Second, the employee must establish
that he or she "can perform the essential functions of the job held or
desired, with or without a reasonable accommodation. '" Under this
analysis, an employee who satisfies both of these criteria may be entitled
to reassignment if no other accommodation will allow the employee to
stay in his or her current position.'
In Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp.,8 the court's analysis of
reassignment as an accommodation continued to evolve. In that case,
the Seventh Circuit ruled that an "employer must consider reassignment
as one form of accommodation" for any disabled employee who is
unable to perform his job.39
Although the Seventh Circuit has undertaken the most extensive
analysis and discussion to date of the phrase "qualified individual with a
disability," that court hardly stands alone in its interpretation. As noted
in Gile, a majority of the courts that have addressed this issue have ruled
that a disabled employee may be entitled to reassignment even though
no accommodation would allow the employee to stay in his or her
current job.4° Since Gile, other courts have relied on the Seventh
Circuit's analysis to define "qualified individual with a disability" and to
provide greater clarity to employers trying to comply with the ADA's
obligation to reassign."
34. 141 F.3d. 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998).
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1162
(10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
37. See Dalton, 141 F.3d at 676; see also Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305. As discussed in Part II,
infra, there is no obligation to reassign if reassignment would result in an undue hardship or
trample the legitimate contractual or quasi-contractual rights of non-disabled employees.
38. 154 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 1998).
39. Id. at 693.
40. See, e.g., Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995);
Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698-99 (5th Cir. 1995); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at
1162; Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1104 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Pedigo v. P.A.M.
Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485-87 (W.D. Ark. 1994); Vazquez v. Bledsoe, 888 F. Supp.
727, 731 (E.D.N.C. 1995); Emrick. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 397 (E.D.
Tex. 1995); Community Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667,676-77 (Colo. 1998).
41. See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1301; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1162-63; Fail, 969 P.2d at
676-77.
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C. The ADA's Legislative History and the EEOC's Interpretation
Support the Majority Interpretation of "Qualified Individual with a
Disability."
At the time of the ADA's passage, Congress recognized that an
overly simplistic reading of the legislative definitions could result in a
circular and nonsensical interpretation of the statute. The Senate
Report on the ADA offered some guidance on the interpretation of the
phrase "qualified individual with a disability":
[S]ection 102(b)(5) [42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)] of the legislation
requires that reasonable accommodation be made for a
"qualified individual who is an applicant or employee." The
term "qualified" as used in this section does not refer to the
definition of "qualified individual with a disability" set forth in
Section 101(7) [42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)] because such an
interpretation would be circular and meaningless. Rather, as in
the Section 504 regulations, the term "qualified" in Section
102(b)(5) means "otherwise qualified" (See 45 C.F.R. §
84.12(a)), i.e., a person with a disability who meets all of an
employer's job-related selection criteria except such criteria he
or she cannot meet because of a disability.
This legislative guidance certainly suggests that a disabled employee
can be entitled to reassignment even if no accommodation would enable
the employee to do his or her current job duties. Leaving nothing to
chance, the Senate report clarified this guidance by stating explicitly that
reassignment should be an option for disabled employees who can no
longer perform the essential functions of their current position:
If an employee, because of a disability, can no longer perform
the essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a
transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qualified
may prevent the employee from being out of work and the
employer from losing a valuable worker.
42. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 33 (1989) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 31-32. In Pedigo, the Court read this legislative history as clear evidence that
Congress intended for employers to consider reassigning any disabled employee who became
unable to continue in his or her current position. See Pedigo, 891 F.Supp. at 486-87. The
Colorado Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Fail, 969 P.2d at 677-78; see also
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
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The EEOC also has taken the position that reassignment should be
an option for disabled employees who can no longer perform their
current job duties:
Reassignment may be an appropriate accommodation when an
employee becomes disabled, when a disability becomes more
severe, or when changes or technological developments in
equipment affect the job performance of an employee with a
disability. If there is no accommodation that will enable the
person to perform the present job, or if it would be an undue
hardship for the employer to provide such accommodation,
reassignment should be considered.'
As a matter of policy, reassignment should be considered for any
disabled employee who cannot continue in his or her current position.
One of the overriding justifications for the ADA's employment
provisions was the desire to reduce the massive unemployment facing
the disabled. 5 This objective is best served by attempting to transfer
disabled employees who can no longer perform the essential functions
of their current jobs to vacant jobs that they are qualified and able to
perform.
Reassignment, however, should not be an employer's primary means
of accommodating disabled workers. To the contrary, reassignment
should be used as an accommodation of last resort. Biased perceptions
about the disabled, and discomfort around those with obvious
disabilities, are precisely the kind of stereotypical attitudes the ADA
attempts to eradicate. These misconceptions could lead some employers
to adopt a policy of reassigning disabled employees to undesirable jobs
with limited opportunities. The EEOC has recognized this concern and
has warned against segregating the workplace through unnecessary
reassignments. ' 6
44. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL at 111-24 (1992). By
way of example, the EEOC offers: "If an employee whose job requires driving loses her
sight, reassignment to a vacant position that does not require driving would be a reasonable
accommodation, if the employee is qualified for that position with or without an
accommodation." Id. at 111-4.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3; see also S.REP. NO. 101-116, at 9; H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-34.
46. According to the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance, "reassignment should be
considered only when accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an
undue hardship .... Reassignment may not be used to limit, segregate, or otherwise
discriminate against employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments to undesirable
[Vol. 83:721
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Employers should view any request for an accommodation as a two-
step inquiry. First, is there any accommodation that will allow this
employee to perform the essential functions of his or her current
position? If not, is there any vacant position which the employee is
qualified and able to perform, with or without an accommodation? Part
II of this article discusses how an employer must balance the rights of
disabled and non-disabled employees when considering reassignment.
II. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF AN EMPLOYER'S REASSIGNMENT
OBLIGATION?
As discussed in Part I, most courts agree that an employee may be
entitled to reassignment when the employee becomes incapable of
remaining in his or her current position. However, the exact parameters
of an employer's duty to reassign are far less clear.
Several courts have defined the duty to reassign only in the
negative-explaining what an employer is not required to do. There is a
consensus among federal courts that the obligation to reassign does not
include any of the following:
-Reassigning a disabled employee to a position for which he or
she is not qualified; '
-Bumping a non-disabled employee from the position he or she
currently holds;' s
-Creating a new position for a disabled employee;-"
-Promoting a disabled employee;Sand
-Violating legitimate transfer policies, seniority policies, the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, or the legitimate
positions or to designated offices or facilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app (1999); see also Gile
v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492,497-98 (7th Cir. 1996).
47. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc);
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu
Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499; Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Fail, 969 P.2d at 673.
48. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305; Baert, 149 F.3d at 633; Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678; Eckles v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499; McCreary v.
Libby-Owens-Ford Co.,132 F.3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1998); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford
Co., 875 F. Supp. 393,397 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Fail, 969 P.2d at 673.
49. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305; Baert, 149 F.3d at 633; Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
62 F.3d. 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1005); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 809 (5th
Cir. 1997); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499; McCreary, 132 F.3d at 1165; Fail, 969 P.2d at 673.
50. See Malabarba v. Chicago Tribune Co., 149 F.3d 690, 699 (7th Cir. 1998); Dalton 141
F.3d at 679; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d 1176; Fail, 969 P.2d at 673.
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contract rights of non-disabled employees."
Fortunately, some courts have given positive guidance to employers
attempting to satisfy their legal obligation to reassign. The Seventh
Circuit has ruled that the ADA may require reassignment to a
completely different job, including a position in a different department,
office, or facility. 2 That court also has recommended a procedure for
analyzing whether a reassignment is possible:
The employer must first identify the full range of alternative
positions for which the individual satisfies the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites, and then determine
whether the employee's own knowledge, skills and abilities
would enable her to perform the essential functions of any of
those alternative positions, with or without reasonable
accommodations. The employer's duty to accommodate requires
it to consider transferring the employee to any of these other
jobs, including those that would represent a demotion.
[T]he "broad range" of jobs to which an employer must look
when considering transfer as a reasonable accommodation for a
disabled employee is bounded from above by the employer's
freedom not to offer a promotion and from below by its
legitimate nondiscriminatory limitations on lateral transfers and
demotions. 3
To date, the most comprehensive discussion of the ADA's obligation
to reassign comes from the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision in Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center.' Aka was an orderly who could no longer
perform the essential functions of his job, even with an accommodation,
because of bypass surgery.5 Aka asked the hospital for a transfer,
51. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305; Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 751 (9th Cir. 1998);
Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114; Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996);
Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678-79; Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1995);
Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051; Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1175-76; cf.,
Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 396-97 (concluding that a reassignment is not unreasonable per se
simply because it violates a collective bargaining agreement or seniority system).
52. See Gile, 95 F.3d at 497-98.
53. Dalton, 141 F.3d at 678-79; see also DePaoli v. Abbott Laboratories, 140 F.3d 668,
674-75 (7th Cir. 1998).
54. 156 F.3d at 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
55. See id. at 1286, 1300 n. 22.
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stating that he wished to remain employed, in any capacity, for pension
purposes.- One of the positions to which Aka sought a transfer was a
file clerk job. Even though Aka met the minimum qualifications for this
position, he was not given any of the four file clerk vacancies that
arose.5s Each of these vacancies went to a non-disabled employee whom
the hospital found to be more qualified!"
Defending its refusal to reassign Aka to any of these four vacant
positions, the hospital first argued that Aka's inability to perform the
duties of his orderly job meant that he was not a qualified individual
with a disability and, thus, was not entitled to any other
accommodation.5 ' Relying on Gile, guidance from the EEOC, and the
ADA's legislative history, the court rejected this argument. 6 The court
ruled that a disabled employee is a qualified individual with a disability
whenever he can perform the essential functions of the position he
holds, or of any position to which he seeks reassignment.61
The hospital and the dissent then argued that even if Aka was a
qualified individual with a disability, the hospital discharged its
obligation to reassign him because it did not deny him a transfer because
of his disability.' The dissent took the position that an employer fully
satisfies its obligation to reassign if it allows a disabled employee to
compete equally with non-disabled employees for a vacant position.'
The majority found several flaws in this position. Turning first to the
plain language of the ADA, the court found Congress' use of the word
"reassign" to be significant:
An employee who is allowed to compete for jobs precisely like
any other applicant has not been 'reassigned'; he may have
changed jobs, but he has done so entirely under his own power,
rather than having been appointed to a new position.
56. See id. at 1286 n. 1.
57. See id. at 1287.
58. See id.
59. See 1d. at 1300.
60. See iL at 1300-01.
61. See id. at 1301 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Court stated that the hospital's
interpretation was nonsensical: "In other words, employees should only be reassigned if they
have no entitlement to reassignment. This is a paradox worthy of Lewis Carroll, whose White
Queen gave her maid 'jam tomorrow and jam yesterday-but never jam today."' IL
62. See id. at 1303.
63. See id. at 1311-12.
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[T]he word "reassign" must mean more than allowing an
employee to apply for a job on the same basis as anyone else.
An employee who on his own initiative applies for and obtains a
job elsewhere in the enterprise would not be described as having
been "reassigned"; the core word "assign" implies some active
effort on the part of the employer. Indeed the ADA's reference
to reassignment would be redundant if permission to apply were
all it meant; the ADA already prohibits discrimination "against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures.'
Second, the majority found no support for the contention that it
would be an impermissible preference to reassign a qualified disabled
employee over a more qualified non-disabled employee.' The court
found the only rational interpretation of the statutory text and
legislative history to be that the obligation to reassign could, in some
cases, compel the transfer of a qualified disabled employee over an
arguably more qualified non-disabled employee. 66 This conclusion
rested, in part, on a distinction between the level of accommodation that
should be afforded disabled applicants versus disabled employees,
"[a]though the ADA's legislative history does warn against
'preferences' for disabled applicants, it also makes clear that reasonable
accommodations for existing employees who become disabled on the job
do not fall within that ban. "67
64. Id. at 1302, 1304 (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F. 3d
1154, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
65. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304-05.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 1304 (citations omitted). Relying on Aka, the Colorado Supreme Court also
has interpreted the ADA's legislative history as imposing a greater burden to accommodate
employees versus applicants. See Community Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 678 (Colo. 1998).
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, went even further. See Midland Brake,
180 F.3d at 1164. In Midland Brake, the dissent argued that the majority's interpretation of
the ADA constituted affirmative action. See id. The majority responded:
However, judicial labels cannot substitute for Congress' statutory mandate in the
ADA. In § 12112(b)(5)(A), Congress defined the term "discriminate" to include
"not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability..." Then, in
§ 12111(9)(D), Congress defined the term "reasonable accommodation" to include
"reassignment to a vacant position." Thus, although the dissent would prefer to
view the reasonable accommodation of reassignment as "affirmative action,"
Congress chose to consider otherwise when it defined the failure reasonably to
accommodate (including reassignment) as a prohibitive act of discrimination. It is
the Congressional definition, of course, that must govern our analysis.
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Aka was the first decision in which a federal court of appeals
considered whether the obligation to reassign requires an employer to
transfer a disabled employee into a vacant position for which the
employee is qualified, even if the disabled employee is not the most
qualified person seeking that positionf. Since Aka, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, issued its decision in Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc.69 That decision relied heavily on Aka to reach the very same
conclusions concerning the scope of an employer's obligation to reassign
disabled employees. Although other circuits have not specifically ruled
on these issues, it is reasonable to assume that they will follow the lead
of Aka and Midland Brake.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has already started down this
path. Aka relied heavily on the rationale of prior Seventh Circuit
decisions. To date, those decisions suggest that the Seventh Circuit will
follow Aka and Midland Brake when asked to decide the same issues.
For example, in Miller v. Illinois Dep't. of Corrections, the court stated:
"Even if an employee.., just says to the employer, 'I want to keep
working for you-do you have any suggestions?' The employer has a
duty under the Act to ascertain whether he has some job that the
employee might be able to fill. 70
Similarly, in Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., the Seventh Circuit
explained that "[a] request as straightforward as asking for continued
employment is a sufficient request for accommodation."'" Once such a
request is made, an employer "has [a] duty to consider reassigning its
disabled employees to other jobs for which they are qualified."' This
duty compels an employer "to identify 'the full range of alternative
positions' available and 'to consider transferring the employee to any of
these other jobs, including those that would represent a demotion."'7 3
Another reason to believe Aka and Midland Brake will be adopted
by other courts is the support for their interpretation in the ADA's
legislative history. One of the overriding purposes of the ADA was to
create employment opportunities for disabled individuals who could
Id. at 1167.
68. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1300-03.
69. 180 F.3d at 1154.
70. 107 F.3d 483,486-87 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
71. 154 F.3d 685,694 (7th Cir. 1998).
72. Id. at 695.
73. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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work and wanted to work.74 Consistent with that goal, the legislative
history made it clear that the purpose of the reassignment obligation
was to keep disabled employees working."
Aka also is consistent with the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA.
The Commission has taken the position that employers must reassign
qualified disabled employees to a vacant position if they can no longer
perform the essential functions of their current position:
Where an employee can no longer perform the essential
functions of his/her original position, with or without a
reasonable accommodation because of a disability.., an
employer must reassign him/her to an equivalent position for
which s/he is qualified, absent undue hardship. If no equivalent
vacant position (in terms of pay, status, etc.) exists, then the
employee must be reassigned to a lower graded position for
which s/he is qualified, absent undue hardship. 6
In March of 1999, the EEOC issued a Policy Guidance on
Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA.' In that Guidance, the
Commission reiterated its position that reassignment should be
considered for any employee who can no longer perform the essential
functions of his or her position because of a disability. 8  The
Commission then affirmed Aka's conclusion that reassignment must
mean more than simply allowing disabled employees to compete for
vacant positions:
Does reassignment mean that the employee is permitted to
compete for a vacant position?
No. Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant
position if s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1999); see also, H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990).
75. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-34.
76. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: "Workers' Compensation and the ADA," ADA
Manual No. 57 at 70:1220 22 (BNA). Although this Guidance refers specifically to
occupational injuries, neither the ADA nor the EEOC have drawn any distinction between
work-related disabilities and other disabilities. Consequently, there is no reason to believe
that the EEOC's opinion would be confined to work-related disabilities.
77. See Ida L. Castro, EEOC Policy Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation Under the
ADA, 40 DAILY LABOR REPORT 1 (March 2,1999)
<http:/lpubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/dir.nsf/id/aOalp5v.7n.3>.
78. See id. at 71-74.
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be of little value and would not be implemented as Congress
intended."
The Tenth Circuit quoted these regulations in Midland Brake.'
Finally, federal courts have taken great pains to avoid becoming
"super-personnel departments.""1 The rationale of Aka and Midland
Brake permits courts to enforce the ADA's legislative mandate without
weighing the relative qualifications of a disabled employee and the non-
disabled worker whom the employer deemed to be "more qualified."
Once a disabled employee proves that he or she is capable of adequately
performing the duties of a vacant position, that person must be
reassigned to the vacant position unless the employer can prove that
undue hardship would result. The relative qualifications of the
disabled employee and any non-disabled employee-applicant become
irrelevant.
79. Id. at 75.
80. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
81. Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458,464 (7th Cir. 1986) ("This Court does not
sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions."); see also
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) ("As another court of
appeals has put it, 'federal courts are not arbitral boards ruling on the strength of 'cause' for
discharge. The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound business
decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination.]"'); Chiarmonte v. Fashion Bed
Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391, 400 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1795 (1998)
("This Court has established that it 'does not sit as a super-personnel department that
reexamines an entity's business decisions."'); Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th
Cir. 1997) (stating that employment discrimination statutes do not "entitle courts to 'sit as
super-personnel departments,' second-guessing the wisdom of businesses' personnel
decisions."); Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Courts refuse to sit in
judgment as super-personnel departments overseeing corporate decisions, even if some
judges think the decisions to be mistaken or perplexing or silly."); Day v. Johnson, 119 F.3d
650, 657 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 707, (1998) ("federal courts are not
self-appointed personnel managers, and they may not second-guess the fairness or wisdom of
an employer's nondiscriminatory employment decision"); Walton v. Bisco Indus. Inc., 119
F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997) ("we do not view the discrimination laws as vehicles for judicial
second-guessing of business decisions.); Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853,
865 ("this court 'does not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's
business decisions"'); Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't. of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("Even if a court suspects that a job applicant 'was victimized by poor selection
procedures' it may not 'second-guess an employer's personnel decision absent demonstrably
discriminatory motive."'); Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 537 (1st Cir. 1996)
("Courts may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits--or even the
rationality--of employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions."').
82. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1998) en banc);
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,1161-64 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
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III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are two basic questions that an employer must answer to
satisfy its obligation to accommodate a disabled employee: (1) Is there
any accommodation that allows this employee to perform the essential
functions of his or her current position? and, if not, (2) Is there any
vacant position this employee is able and qualified to fill, with or
without accommodation?
Reassignment should be considered only after every avenue of
accommodating the employee in his or her position has been exhausted.
To determine if an employee can be accommodated in his or her current
position, an employer should review all medical information relevant to
the employee's work restrictions. The employer then should meet with
the employee for the purpose of agreeing on the essential functions of
the employee's current position; the physical, mental, or emotional
demands of that position; and the way in which the employee's
condition creates challenges to the performance of these essential
functions. The employer, employee, health care providers retained by
either or both, and outside consultants such as the Federal Job
Accommodation Network, should be consulted to discuss possible
accommodations.
Once possible accommodations have been identified, the employer
should analyze whether any accommodations would create an undue
hardship. After eliminating any unduly burdensome accommodations,
the employer is free to choose among effective accommodations, even if
the accommodation chosen is not the first choice of the employee.
If there is no accommodation that allows the employee to perform
the essential functions of his or her current position without an undue
hardship, the employer and the employee should discuss the employee's
ability to perform the duties of any currently vacant positions. There
also may be an obligation to analyze positions that become vacant
within a reasonable time. For example, some collective bargaining
agreements create an entitlement to a twelve month medical leave of
absence. If the employee is on a medical leave of absence because the
employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his or her
current position, there may well be an obligation to transfer the
employee into a position that becomes vacant during the medical leave
of absence. "
83. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance states:
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Finally, one question that continues to be debated is whether an
employer has an obligation to transfer an employee into a position that
is currently vacant, but which has been posted. According to the
EEOC, the critical inquiry is whether the position is vacant now, or
within a reasonable time after it has become clear that the employee
cannot perform the essential functions of his or her current job.' In its
Policy Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, the
Commission stated: "A position is considered vacant even if an
employer has posted a notice or announcement seeking applications for
that position."' If vacancy and qualifications are the only factors, an
employer has an obligation to transfer a disabled employee to a vacant
position for which he or she is qualified, regardless of whether the
posting process has begun.
The Rehabilitation Act regulations take a different position. Under
those regulations, if an employer becomes aware of the need for
reassignment of a disabled employee after posting a position, the
employer simply must allow the disabled employee to compete equally
with those employees who have already begun the posting process.'
Until the courts clarify this issue, the most conservative approach is to
transfer disabled employees into currently vacant positions that match
their qualifications and abilities, even if those positions were posted
before it was known that the employee was unable to perform his or her
current position.
As a matter of public policy, this conservative approach makes
sense. Congress has found that society benefits from the employment of
capable individuals with disabilities.' This public policy is served best
As an example, suppose there is no vacant position available at the time that an
individual with a disability requests reassignment as a reasonable accommodation.
The employer, however, knows that an equivalent position for which the individual
is qualified, will become vacant next week. Under these circumstances, the
employer should reassign the individual to the position when it becomes available.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) App.
84. See id.
85. Castro, supra note 77, at 77.
86. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(g) (1997).
87. The Senate Committee on Education and Human Resources stated:
Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and
poverty.
According to a recent Lou Harris poll, not working is perhaps the truest definition
of what it means to be disabled in America. Two thirds of all disabled Americans
between the ages
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when qualified disabled employees are reassigned to vacant positions,
regardless of whether a more qualified non-disabled person has
expressed interest in the position or the job has been posted.
By way of example, assume that a disabled employee becomes
unable to remain in his or her position after a vacancy has been posted.
Two non-disabled employees have signed the posting. One of these
non-disabled employees appears to be the most qualified of the three.
However, all three are qualified and there is no reason to suspect that
the disabled employee would not perform competently. Assume further
that there are no seniority policies that disqualify any of these
employees. If the non-disabled employee is transferred, the disabled
employee may very well lose his or her job (assuming this is the only
viable reassignment option). This result does not advance the goal of
employing capable disabled people. On the other hand, if the disabled
employee is reassigned, no one is out of a job and the policies
underlying the ADA are achieved.
An employer may argue against the transfer of the disabled
employee in this hypothetical by claiming that the employer's
established policy is to transfer the most qualified employee.' Such a
policy differs from the seniority policies to which courts traditionally
have given deference. Unlike those seniority policies, a "most
qualified" policy includes a necessary element of subjectivity and risks
the obliteration of the statutory obligation to reassignY Allowing this
of 16 and 64 are not working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working say
that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age disabled, who are not
working, say that they would like to have a job. Translated into absolute terms, this
means that about 8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find a
job.
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32-34 (1990).
88. The dissenters unsuccessfully advanced a similar argument in both Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) and Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164-67 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
89. For example, in Dalton v. Subaru-lsuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678-79 (7th
Cir. 1998), the court acknowledged an employer's right to maintain legitimate and
nondiscriminatory transfer policies that could narrow the scope of its obligation to reassign.
See 141 F.3d at 678-79. However, the Court was quick to state that policies which had the
practical effect of obliterating the obligation to reassign would be invalid:
An employer cannot, of course, convert its responsibility to look to a "broad range"
of jobs into a "narrow band" simply by adopting a "no transfer" policy. Any such
policy would remain subject to challenge both for any disparate impact it might
impose on disabled employees, and for any unreasonable inflexibility in the face of a
demand for reasonable adjustments to accommodate a disabled candidate for
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sort of policy to bar the reassignment of a qualified disabled employee
also would force courts to weigh the relative merits of all disabled and
non-disabled applicants. °
Employers also may argue that transferring a disabled employee
over a more qualified non-disabled employee constitutes an
impermissible preference for the disabled.9 However, the reality is that
the ADA does require special treatment of the disabled. The ADA's
obligations are markedly different from statutes like Title VII, which do
no more than prohibit discrimination because of a protected
characteristic such as race or gender.' The only provision of Title VII
that places any affirmative obligation on employers is the provision
requiring accommodation of the religious observances and practices of
employees and applicants.93 This provision has been interpreted to
impose no more than a de minimis burden on employers.94
The ADA, on the other hand, requires affirmative action by
employers to accommodate disabled applicants and employees, up to
the point of undue hardship. Both Congress and the courts have
affirmed that the ADA imposes a much heavier burden on employers
transfer.
Id. at 679.
Similarly, in McCreary v. Libbey-Owes Ford Co., 132 F. 3d 1159, 1165 (7th Cir. 1997), the
court suggested that the obligation to reassign to a vacant position is mandatory: "[T]he ADA
requires reassignment to a vacant position when the employee is no longer able to perform
the essential functions of her employment, even with a reasonable accommodation, and the
employee is qualified for the vacant position." Id. Like the EEOC, the Court focused on
vacancy and qualification, saying nothing about whether prior posting would have any impact
on the obligation to accommodate. See IL
Also, cases interpreting the 1992 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act have found that
reassignment is mandatory unless an undue hardship would result. See, e.g., Shiring v.
Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1996). It is difficult to imagine how undue hardship would
result from terminating the posting process to award a vacant position to a disabled employee
who is qualified for it.
90. As discussed in note 81, supra, federal courts studiously avoid any attempt to sit as
"super-personnel departments." See Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458,464 (7th Cir.
1986).
91. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304-05; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167-68.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998).
93. Title VII compels an employer "to reasonably accommodate.., an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice [to the point of] undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ea).
94. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Congress specifically
rejected this definition of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. See S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 36 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990).
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than the religious accommodation provision of Title VII.95
An employer must make special accommodations for disabled
applicants, and may not penalize them for those accommodations.
Employers bear an even greater burden to accommodate disabled
employees. The obligation to accommodate disabled employees may
require reassignment to a vacant position. The only interpretation of
this reassignment obligation which is faithful to the language of the
ADA, and its legislative history, is an interpretation that requires the
transfer of a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position except
when reassignment results in an undue hardship, violates a legitimate
contract right of a non-disabled employee, or a bona fide seniority or
transfer policy. A policy requiring all employees to compete for the
purpose of selecting the most qualified employee does not pass muster.
Such a policy eviscerates the accommodation and reassignment
provisions of the ADA; reducing the statute to no more than a
prohibition of discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of the ADA is to eliminate those barriers that prevent the
disabled from fully participating in society. To achieve this goal in the
employment context, the ADA required, for the first time, that
employers consider reassigning disabled employees as a preferable
alternative to unemployment. The obligation to accommodate,
including the obligation to reassign, is an affirmative obligation that
entitles the disabled to "special privileges." Consequently, if the
statutory obligation to accommodate by reassignment is to have any
meaning, employers must reassign qualified disabled employees, even if
a more qualified, non-disabled applicant is available.
95. See S. REP. No. 101-116 at 35-36 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990).
See also, Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[w]e do
not maintain that the ADA duty of 'reasonable accommodation' is equivalent to that under
the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII").
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